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Abstract
Using semi-tensor product of matrices, the structures of several kinds of symmetric games are investigated via the linear
representation of symmetric group in the structure vector of games as its representation space. First of all, the symmetry,
described as the action of symmetric group on payoff functions, is converted into the product of permutation matrices with
structure vectors of payoff functions. Using the linear representation of the symmetric group in structure vectors, the algebraic
conditions for the ordinary, weighted, renaming and name-irrelevant symmetries are obtained respectively as the invariance
under the corresponding linear representations. Secondly, using the linear representations the relationship between symmetric
games and potential games is investigated. This part is mainly focused on Boolean games. An alternative proof is given to
show that ordinary, renaming and weighted symmetric Boolean games are also potential ones under our framework. The
corresponding potential functions are also obtained. Finally, an example is given to show that some other Boolean games could
also be potential games.
Key words: Symmetric game, linear representation, potential game, Boolean game, semi-tensor product of matrices.
1 Introduction
Symmetric game is an important class of games. It has
drawn a considerable attention from both game theoret-
ical community and system scientists. There are several
reasons for this: First of all, symmetry represents “fair”.
In real world, a fair game ismore realistic and acceptable.
That makes many commonly played games symmetric.
For instance, Rock-Paper-Scissors, Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Hawk and Dove, etc. are all symmetric. If more general
types of symmetric games are considered, many other
games such as Battle of the sexes, Matching Pennies,
etc. are also symmetric. Secondly, symmetry can greatly
simplify the representation and computation of game re-
lated issues [22]. Finally, symmetry may be related with
certain other properties. For instance, it is well known
that a finite symmetric Boolean game, i.e., a game with
a common action set of size 2, is an exact potential game
[15].
The concept of symmetric games was firstly proposed
by J. Nash in his famous paper [21]. Lately, it has been
developed into several classes of interesting games [1],
[18], [4]. According to [4], there are two commonly recog-
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nized classes of symmetric games: (1) ordinary symmet-
ric game; (2) name-irrelevant symmetric game. The first
one is very natural, which means all the payoffs are es-
sentially the same. The second one is firstly proposed by
Peleg et al [23], based on a simple type of strategy per-
mutations of Nash [21]. A new class of symmetric games
was proposed in [4] as the renaming symmetric game.
(See also [6]).
From mathematical point of view, a symmetry means
invariance under the action of certain group. Roughly
speaking, a game is symmetric means its payoff func-
tions are invariant under a permutation group, which is
a subgroup of a symmetric group [12].
Linear representation of a group A in a vector space V
is an isomorphism A→ GL(V ) [24]. This representation
not only makes the group action easily computable but
also provides a framework to investigate certain proper-
ties of the action. In this paper we reveal for each sym-
metry of games its linear representation, which is the
action of symmetric group or its subgroups on the struc-
ture vector of games. The structure vector of a game
consists of the structure vectors of its payoff functions.
To construct and to investigate the linear representa-
tions of symmetric games the semi-tensor product (STP)
of matrices becomes a main tool. STP of matrices is a
newly developedmatrix product [8]. It is a generalization
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of conventional matrix product and keeps most proper-
ties of conventional matrix product remaining available.
It has been successfully used for studying logical (con-
trol) systems. We refer to [7], [19], [13], [20], [25], [27],
[26], just to name a few. It has also been used to game
theoretic control problems [14], [9], [10], [28].
Vector space structure of finite games is a key issue in
this linear representation approach to symmetric games.
A clear picture of vector space structure of finite games
was firstly presented in [3]. This vector space structure
was then modified and merged into an Euclidean space
[11]. In this paper a finite gameGwith player set |N | = n
and strategy set |Si| = ki, i = 1, · · · , n, is simply con-
sidered as a point in Rs, where s = n
∏n
i=1 ki, denoted
by VG ∈ Rs. Such a set is denoted by G[n;k1,··· ,kn], which
has the same topology and vector space structure as Rs,
as demonstrated in [11].
The first purpose of this paper is to deduce the linear
representations for each of the aforementioned symme-
tries of finite games, considering as the action of sym-
metric group or its proper subgroups in the vector space
G[n;k1,··· ,kn] ∼ R
s, which consists of the structure vec-
tors of all payoff functions. Then it is proved that a fi-
nite game G is certain kind of symmetry, if and only if,
its structure vector is invariant under the corresponding
linear representation. This presentation gives an easy
way to verify whether a finite game G is of this kind
of symmetry. Moreover, the matrix form of linear rep-
resentations provides a framework for investigating the
properties of symmetric games and manipulating them.
Secondly, the relationship between certain symmetric
games and potential games is investigated.Wemainly fo-
cus on Boolean games. The ordinary and renaming sym-
metric Boolean games are proved to be potential games
and the weighted symmetric Boolean games are proved
to be weighted potential games.
Thirdly, a special kind of Boolean games, called the
negation-symmetric Boolean game, is defined and inves-
tigated. We prove that this kind of Boolean games is also
potential. It shows that (generalized) ordinary symme-
try is sufficient for a Boolean game to be potential, but
it is not necessary.
Finally, for statement ease, we give some notations:
(1) Mm×n: the set of m× n real matrices.
(2) Bm×n: the set of m× n Boolean matrices, (Bn: the
set of n dimensional Boolean vectors.)
(3) D := {0, 1}.
(4) δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In.
(5) ∆n :=
{
δin|i = 1, · · · , n
}
.
(6) 1ℓ = (1, 1, · · · , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ℓ
)T .
(7) 0p×q: a p× q matrix with zero entries.
(8) A matrix L ∈ Mm×n is called a logical matrix if
the columns of L are of the form of δkm. That is,
Col(L) ⊂ ∆m. Denote by Lm×n the set of m × n
logical matrices.
(9) If L ∈ Ln×r, by definition it can be expressed as
L = [δi1n , δ
i2
n , · · · , δ
ir
n ]. For the sake of compactness,
it is briefly denoted as L = δn[i1, i2, · · · , ir].
(10) Mn, the structure matrix of “negation”, that is,
Mn = δ2[2, 1].
(11) Sn: n-th order symmetric group.
(12) Pn: n-th order Boolean orthogonal group.
(13) Let H, G be two groups. H < G means H is a
subgroup of G.
(14) Θ[n;κ]: block permutation group (Θ[n;κ] < Snκ).
(15) id: identity mapping.
(16) GL(n,R) (or GL(V )): general linear group.
(17) G[n;k1,··· ,kn]: Set of finite games with |N | = n, |Si| =
ki.
(18) G[n;κ]: |Si| = κ, i = 1, · · · , n.
(19) So[n;κ]: the set of ordinary symmetric games.
(20) Sw[n;κ]: the set of weighted symmetric games.
(21) Sr[n;κ]: the set of renaming symmetric games.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 considers the action of symmetric group on games.
Subsection 2.1 introduces symmetric group and its ma-
trix expression. Subsection 2.2 reviews the semi-tensor
product (STP) of matrices, which is a fundamental tool
in this paper. Using STP, Subsection 2.3 expresses the
group action on finite game into matrix form. Section 3
provides the linear representation for ordinary symme-
try of games. Continued from Section 3, Section 4 intro-
duces the weighted symmetry and renaming symmetry,
which are two simple extensions of ordinary symmetry.
The name-irrelevant symmetry and its linear represen-
tation are discussed in Section 5. Some examples are pre-
sented to depict them. The potential game is introduced
in Section 6. The verification of potential games and the
formula for calculating potential function are also pre-
sented. Section 7 shows the relationship between poten-
tial games and symmetric games for Boolean games only.
It was shown that an ordinary symmetric Boolean game
and a renaming symmetric Boolean game are potential
game. (These conclusions are well known, but we give an
alternative proof.) And a weighted symmetric Boolean
game is a weighted potential game. The corresponding
potential functions are also obtained respectively. Sec-
tion 8 introduces the negation-symmetric Boolean game
and proved that it is also a potential game. Section 9 is a
concluding remark, which shows that all the symmetries
discussed in this paper can be characterized by a unified
form of linear representations. This characteristic prop-
erty reveals the relationship among them. The relation-
ship between symmetric games and potential games is
also summarized. To streamline the presentation, some
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
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2 Action of Symmetric Group on Games
2.1 Symmetric Group and Boolean Orthogonal Group
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Sn is the set of permutations
of elements of N . With the composed permutation as
the product of two permutations, Sn becomes a group.
The elements in Sn can be expressed either by a one-one
correspondence or a product of cycles. We use a simple
example to depict them.
Example 1 Consider S5, σ, µ ∈ S5 can be expressed as
σ :
1 2 3 4 5
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
3 5 1 4 2
; µ :
1 2 3 4 5
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
2 4 5 3 1
.
Equivalently, they can be expressed in cycle form as
σ = (1, 3)(2, 5); µ = (1, 2, 4, 3, 5).
The product of σ and µ is defined as
µ ◦ σ = (1, 5, 4, 3, 2).
Note that in the above product, the permutation σ is per-
formed first, and then µ is performed. Say, 1
σ
−→ 3
µ
−→ 5,
which leads to 1
µ◦σ
−−→ 5, etc.
Let G be a group and X 6= ∅, φ : G ×X → X is called
a group action of G on X , if
φ(e, x) = x, e ∈ G is the identity, x ∈ X
φ(g2, φ(g1, x)) = φ(g2g1, x), g1, g2 ∈ G, x ∈ X.
The symmetric group has a natural action on N , that
is, σ × i 7→ σ(i).
For each σ ∈ Sn, we can construct a Boolean orthogonal
matrix, called the structure matrix of σ, as
Pσ =
[
δσ(1)n , δ
σ(2)
n , · · · , δ
σ(n)
n
]
. (1)
Define the set of structure matrices of n-th order per-
mutations as
Pn := {Pσ | σ ∈ Sn} . (2)
Note that the set of n-th order Boolean orthogonal ma-
trices is a subgroup of the general linear group GL(n,R).
Moreover, it is obvious that there is a one-one correspon-
dence between Pn and the set of n-th order Boolean or-
thogonal matrices. We, therefore, have Pn < GL(n,R).
Next, define ψ : Sn → Pn as
ψ(σ) := Pσ, (3)
then ψ is a group isomorphism. That is, ψ is bijective
and
ψ(µ ◦ σ) = Pµ◦σ = PµPσ = ψ(µ)ψ(σ). (4)
It is easy to see that
(1) Pn has a natural group action on ∆n as
Pσδ
i
n = δ
σ(i)
n ∈ ∆n, i = 1, · · · , n; (5)
(2) if we identify i ∼ δin, then the group action of Sn
on N is exactly the same as the group action of Pn
on ∆n. Precisely,
σ(i) ∼ Pσδ
i
n. (6)
2.2 Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
This subsection is a brief introduction to semi-tensor
product (STP) of matrices.We refer to [7], [8] for details.
The STP of matrices is defined as follows:
Definition 2 Let M ∈ Mm×n, N ∈ Mp×q, and t =
lcm{n, p} be the least common multiple of n and p. The
STP of M and N is defined as
M ⋉N :=
(
M ⊗ It/n
) (
N ⊗ It/p
)
∈ Mmt/n×qt/p, (7)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
The STP of matrices is a generalization of conventional
matrix product, and all the computational properties
of the conventional matrix product remain available.
Throughout this paper, the default matrix product is
STP, so the product of two arbitrary matrices is well
defined, and the symbol ⋉ is mostly omitted.
First, we give some basic properties of STP, which will
be used in the sequel.
Proposition 3 (1) (Associative Law:)
A⋉ (B ⋉ C) = (A⋉B)⋉ C. (8)
(2) (Distributive Law:)
(A+B)⋉ C = A⋉ C +B ⋉ C; (9)
C ⋉ (A+B) = C ⋉A+ C ⋉B. (10)
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Proposition 4 Let X ∈ Rt be a t dimensional column
vector, and M a matrix. Then
X ⋉M = (It ⊗M)⋉X. (11)
Next, we consider the matrix expression of logical rela-
tions. Identifying
1 ∼ δ12 , 0 ∼ δ
2
2 ,
then a logical variable x ∈ D can be expressed in vector
form as
x ∼
(
x
1− x
)
,
which is called the vector form expression of x
A mapping f : Dn → R is called a pseudo-Boolean
function.
Proposition 5 Given a pseudo-Boolean function f :
Dn → R, there exists a unique row vector Vf ∈ R
2n ,
called the structure vector of f , such that (in vector form)
f(x1, · · · , xn) = Vf ⋉
n
i=1 xi. (12)
Remark 6 In previous proposition, if D is replaced by
Dk, k > 2, then the function f is called a pseudo-logical
function and the result remains available with an obvious
modification that xi ∈ ∆k and Vf ∈ Rk
n
.
Definition 7 A swap matrix W[m,n] ∈ Mmn×mn is de-
fined as
W[m,n] := [δ
1
nδ
1
m, δ
2
nδ
1
m, · · · , δ
n
nδ
1
m, δ
1
nδ
2
m,
· · · , δnnδ
2
m, · · · , δ
1
nδ
m
m , · · · , δ
n
nδ
m
m ].
(13)
The basic function of a swap matrix is to swap two vec-
tors.
Proposition 8 LetX ∈ Rm and Y ∈ Rn be two column
vectors. Then
W[m,n]XY = Y X. (14)
The swap matrix has following decomposition property.
Proposition 9
W[p,qr] =
(
Iq ⊗W[p,r]
) (
W[p,q] ⊗ Ir
)
. (15)
Definition 10 [17,8] Assume A ∈ Mp×s, B ∈ Mq⊗s,
the Khatri-Rao product of A, B, denoted by A ∗ B, is
defined as
A ∗B = [Col1(A)⋉ Col1(B),Col2(A)⋉ Col2(B),
· · · ,Cols(A)⋉ Cols(B)] ∈Mpq×s.
(16)
Proposition 11 Assume x ∈ ∆n, y ∈ ∆p, z ∈ ∆q,
where y, z are logical functions of x and are expressed in
algebraic form as
y =Mx, M ∈ Lp×n
z = Nx, N ∈ Lq×n.
(17)
Then we have
yz = (M ∗N)x. (18)
2.3 Matrix Expression of Finite Games under Action
of Sn
A finite game, denoted by a triple G = (N,S,C), con-
sists of three components: (i) the set of players N =
{1, 2, · · · , n}; (ii) the profile set S =
∏n
i=1 Si, where
Si = {1, 2, · · · , ki}, is the set of strategies of player i,
i = 1, · · · , n; the set of payoffs C = {c1, · · · , cn}, where
ci : S → R is the payoff function of player i, i = 1, · · · , n.
Denote the set of G with |N | = n and |Si| = ki by
G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. If |Si| = κ, i = 1, · · · , n, the set of such
games is briefly denoted by G[n;κ]. This paper concerns
only G[n;κ].
Assume a game G ∈ G[n;κ] is given. It is obvious that
the payoff function ci is a pseudo-logical function. When
the strategies xi, i = 1, · · · , n, are expressed into their
vector form, the payoff functions can be expressed as
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 xj := V
c
i x, i = 1, · · · , n,
(19)
where
x = ⋉ni=1xi ∈ ∆κn (20)
is called the STP form of the strategy profile. We can
also express it in a (column) vector form as
~x := [xT1 , x
T
2 , · · · , x
T
n ]
T ∈ Bnκ. (21)
Denoting
Φi := 1
T
κi−1 ⊗ Iκ ⊗ 1
T
κn−i, i = 1, · · · , n, (22)
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then a matrix Φ can be constructed as
Φ :=


Φ1
Φ2
...
Φn

 ∈ Bnκ×κn . (23)
This Φ can convert a profile from its STP form into its
vector form.
Proposition 12 Let G ∈ G[n;κ], x and ~x are STP form
and vector form of its strategy profile respectively. Then
~x = Φx. (24)
Next, assume σ ∈ Sn. A straightforward computation
shows that
Pσ~x =


xσ−1(1)
xσ−1(2)
...
xσ−1(n)

 =


Φσ−1(1)
Φσ−1(2)
...
Φσ−1(n)

 x. (25)
The following expression can be proved by using formula
(25) and Proposition 11.
Proposition 13 Let σ ∈ Sn. Define
σ(x) := ⋉ni=1xσ−1(i). (26)
Then
σ(x) = Tσx, (27)
where
Tσ = Φσ−1(1) ∗ Φσ−1(2) ∗ · · · ∗ Φσ−1(n). (28)
Finally, we give an expression for calculation Φσ−1(i). In
fact, substituting (24) into (25) and we have


Φσ−1(1)
Φσ−1(2)
...
Φσ−1(n)

 = Pσ


Φ1
Φ2
...
Φn

 . (29)
3 Ordinary Symmetry and its Linear Represen-
tation
Define the structure vector of G ∈ G[n;κ] as
VG := [V
c
1 , V
c
2 , · · · , V
c
n ] ∈ R
nκn , (30)
then the gameG is completely determined by VG. In this
way, we have a vector space structure (precisely, Rnκ
n
)
for G[n;κ]. We refer to [3], [11] for the vector structure of
finite games.
Hereafter, we adopt the terminologies used in [4] to de-
scribe the symmetry of games.
Definition 14 A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is called ordinary
symmetric if for any σ ∈ Sn
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = cσ(i)(xσ−1(1), xσ−1(2), · · · , xσ−1(n)),
i = 1, · · · , n.
(31)
Using (25)-(27), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 15 A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is ordinary sym-
metric, if and only if, for any σ ∈ Sn
V ci = V
c
σ(i)Tσ, i = 1, · · · , n. (32)
Denote
V σG := [V
c
σ(1), · · · , V
c
σ(n)].
Then we have the following result:
Theorem 16 G ∈ G[n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and
only if,
VG(Pσ ⊗ Tσ) = VG, ∀σ ∈ Sn. (33)
Proof. According to Proposition 15, it is enough to show
that (33) and (32) are equivalent. From (32), we have
the following identity
VG = [V
c
σ(1)Tσ, V
c
σ(2)Tσ, · · · , V
c
σ(n)Tσ] = V
σ
G (In ⊗ Tσ)
(34)
On the other hand, a straightforward computation ver-
ifies
V σG = VGPσ. (35)
Substituting it into (34) gives rise to (33). On the con-
trary, splitting (33) to each block component V ci , it is
5
easy to obtain (34) which yields (32). This completes the
proof of Theorem 16. ✷
Definition 17 [24] A linear representation of a finite
group A in a finite vector space V is a homomorphism ψ
from the group A into the group of GL(V ).
Now consider the vector space G[n;κ] ∼ R
nκn . That is,
eachG ∈ G[n;κ] is represented by its structure vector VG.
Then we have a linear representation of σ ∈ Sn in G[n;κ]
as follows:
Proposition 18 Define a mapping of σ ∈ Sn in vector
space G[n;κ] as
ϕ(σ) := Pσ ⊗ Tσ ∈ GL(G[n;κ]). (36)
Then ϕ is a linear representation of Sn in G[n;κ].
Proof. We already have (4), that is,
Pµ◦σ = PµPσ.
What do we need to prove is
Tµ◦σ = TµTσ. (37)
This equation comes from (28) and (29).
✷
Corollary 19 G ∈ G[n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and
only if, it is invariant with respect to the linear represen-
tation ϕ, defined by (36).
We give an example to depict this:
Example 20 Consider G ∈ G[3;3]. Denote
S3 = {σi | i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6},
where
σ1 = id σ2 = (2, 3) σ3 = (1, 2)
σ4 = (1, 2, 3) σ5 = (1, 3, 2) σ6 = (1, 3).
Then we have
Pσ1 = I3 Pσ2 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0


Pσ3 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1

 Pσ4 =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


Pσ5 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 Pσ6 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

 ;
and
Tσ1 = id
Tσ2 = δ27[1, 4, 7, 2, 5, 8, 3, 6, 9,
10, 13, 16, 11, 14, 17, 12, 15, 18,
19, 22, 25, 20, 23, 26, 21, 24, 27]
Tσ3 = δ27[1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21,
4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24,
7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18, 25, 26, 27]
Tσ4 = δ27[1, 10, 19, 2, 11, 20, 3, 12, 21,
4, 13, 22, 5, 14, 23, 6, 15, 24,
7, 16, 25, 8, 17, 26, 9, 18, 27]
Tσ5 = δ27[1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22, 25,
2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26,
3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27]
Tσ6 = δ27[1, 10, 19, 4, 13, 22, 7, 16, 25,
2, 11, 20, 5, 14, 23, 8, 17, 26,
3, 12, 21, 6, 15, 24, 9, 18, 27].
According to Theorem 16, G is ordinary symmetric, if
and only if,
V TG ∈
6⋂
i=1
(
PTσi ⊗ T
T
σi − I81
)⊥
. (38)
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A simple computation shows that (38) implies that
VG = [A,D,E,D, F,G,E,G,H
I, J,K, J,B, L,K,L,M
N,O, P,O,Q,R, P,R,C
A,D,E, I, J,K,N,O, P
D, F,G, J,B, L,O,Q,R
E,G,H,K,L,M,P,R,C
A, I,N,D, J,O,E,K, P
D, J,O, F,B,Q,G,L,R
E,K, P,G, L,R,H,M,C],
(39)
where the parametersA,B, · · · , R are arbitrary real num-
bers. Denote by So[n;κ] the ordinary symmetric subspace
of G[n;κ]. Then we know that
dim
(
So[3;3]
)
= 18,
and a basis of So[3;3] can easily be figured out from (39).
4 Generalized Ordinary Symmetric Game
4.1 Weighted Symmetric Games
Definition 21 Let G ∈ G[n;κ], µi ∈ R+, i = 1, · · · , n,
be a set of positive real numbers, called the weights.
(1) G is said to be weighted symmetric with respect to
σ ∈ Sn and {µi, i = 1, · · · , n}, if
µici(x1, · · · , xn) = µσ(i)cσ(i)
(
xσ−1(1), · · · ,
xσ−1(n)
)
, i = 1, · · · , n.
(40)
(2) G is said to be weighted symmetric with respect to
{µi, i = 1, · · · , n} if it is weighted symmetric with
respect to each σ ∈ Sn and µi, i = 1, · · · , n.
Remark 22 When µi = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, the weighted
symmetry becomes the classical ordinary symmetry.
Example 23 Consider G ∈ G[2;2]. The payoff bi-matrix
is in Table 1.
Table 1
Payoff Bi-matrix
P1\P2 1 2
1 2, 3 4, 9
2 6, 6 4, 6
Then
3c1(1, 1) = 2c2(1, 1) = 6 3c1(2, 2) = 2c2(2, 2) = 12
3c1(1, 2) = 2c2(2, 1) = 12 3c1(2, 1) = 2c2(1, 2) = 18.
Hence G is a weighted symmetric game with weights:
µ1 = 3 and µ2 = 2.
Similar to Proposition 15, we have the following result.
Proposition 24 G ∈ G[n;κ] is weighted symmetric with
respect to {µi | i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if, for each
σ ∈ Sn
µiV
c
i = µσ(i)V
c
σ(i)Tσ, (41)
where Tσ is defined in (28).
Define a weight matrix Γ as
Γ := diag(µ1, µ2, · · · , µn),
where µi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n. Using Γ, for each σ ∈ Sn we
define
ϕµ(σ) := Γ (Pσ ⊗ Tσ) Γ
−1 ∈ GL(G[n;κ]). (42)
Corresponding to Theorem 16, Proposition 18, and
Corollary 19, we have
Theorem 25 (1) The mapping ϕµ defined in (42) is a
linear representation of Sn in G[n;κ].
(2) A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is weighted ordinary symmetric
with respect to {µi, i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if, VG
is invariant with respect to this linear representa-
tion.
4.2 Renaming Symmetric Game
Definition 26 [4] Let G ∈ G[n;κ], then
(1) A renaming of G is a set of permutations ri ∈ Sκ
on Si, i = 1, · · · , n.
(2) A renaming game Gr := (N, (Sri )i∈N , (c
r
i )i∈N ),
where
Sri = {ri(1), ri(2), · · · , ri(κ)} ,
cri (x1, · · · , xn) = c
r
i (r
−1
1 (x1), · · · , r
−1
n (xn)).
(43)
(3) G is renaming symmetric if there exists a renaming
r = (r1, · · · , rn) such that Gr is ordinary symmet-
ric.
Example 27 Consider the Battle of the Sexes, where
Player 1 is husband, Player 2 is wife, F is football and C
is concert. The payoff bi-matrix is as in Table 2
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Table 2
Payoff Bi-matrix of Battle of the Sexes
P1\P2 F C
F 2, 1 0, 0
C 0, 0 1, 2
It is obvious that this game is not ordinary symmetric.
But if we rename the strategies in S2 as F ∼ 2 andC ∼ 1,
i.e., choose r1 = id and r2 = Mn, then it becomes ordi-
nary symmetric. Hence Battle of the Sexes is renaming
symmetric.
Similar to Proposition 15, we can have the following re-
sult.
Proposition 28 G ∈ G[n;κ] is renaming symmetric with
rename r = (r1, · · · , rn), if and only if, for any σ ∈ Sn
V ci = V
c
σ(i)T
r
σ , i = 1, · · · , n, (44)
where
T rσ = Γ
T
r TσΓr (45)
and
Γr = Pr1 ⊗ Pr2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Prn . (46)
Proof. Denote the structure vectors of the renaming sym-
metric game as V ri , i = 1, · · · , n.
By definition, we have
V ri ⋉
n
j=1 xj = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 r
−1
j (xj)
= V ci ⋉
n
j=1
(
P−1rj xj
)
= V ci Γ
−1
r ⋉
n
j=1 xj
= V ci Γ
T
r ⋉
n
j=1 xj ,
where Γr is defined in (46). Hence we have
V ri = V
c
i Γ
T
r . (47)
On the other hand, Using the fact that Gr is ordinary
symmetric, we have, in light of Proposition 15,
V ri = V
r
σ(i)Tσ = V
c
σ(i)Γ
T
r Tσ. (48)
Comparing (47) with (48) yields (44)-(45). ✷
The following result is parallel to Theorem 16 with a
mimic proof.
Theorem 29 Given a renaming r = (r1, r2, · · · , rn),
where ri ∈ Sκ.
(1) The mapping ϕr : Sn → GL(G[n;κ]) defined as
ϕr(σ) := Pσ ⊗ T
r
σ , σ ∈ Sn (49)
is a linear representation.
(2) G ∈ G[n;κ] is renaming symmetric, if and only if,
there exists a renaming such that VG is invariant
with respect to the linear representation ϕr.
Remark 30 Both weighted symmetry and renaming
symmetry are theoretically almost trivial. In fact, any
property of ordinary symmetry has its corresponding
property for weighted or renaming symmetry with some
obvious modifications. But from application point of
view, the two generalizations enlarged the region of sym-
metric games a lot, which tremendously expands the
application of symmetric game theory.
4.3 Verification of Symmetry
Let S be a finite group and V be a finite dimensional vec-
tor space, andϕ : S→ GL(V ) be a linear representation.
ThenW ⊂ V is called a row (column) invariant subspace
of ϕ, if Wϕ(σ) ⊂ W , (correspondingly, ϕ(σ)W ⊂ W ),
∀σ ∈ S.
In this paper, taking the structure of VG into consider-
ation, the row invariance is considered as a default in-
variance.
The following proposition comes from the definition of
linear representation immediately.
Proposition 31 Let ϕ : S → GL(V ) be a linear repre-
sentation, and
Ω := {ω1, ω2, · · · , ωs} ⊂ S
be a set of generators of S, i.e., S = 〈Ω〉. Then W ⊂ V
is invariant with respect to ϕ, if and only if,
Wϕ(ω) ⊂W, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (50)
This proposition makes the verification of ordinary (or
weighted, or renaming ) symmetry easier. Because ac-
cording to Corollary 19, Theorem 25 or Theorem 29,
instead verifying the invariance with respect to all ele-
ments of Sn, we need only to verify it for a set of gener-
ators.
Next, we recall some standard sets of generators of Sn.
Proposition 32 [16]
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(1) Sn is generated by transpositions (switches). That
is,
Sn = 〈(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n〉 . (51)
(2) Sn is generated by transpositions with 1. That is,
Sn = 〈(1, r) | 1 < j ≤ n〉 . (52)
Example 33 Recall Example 20. Since
S3 = 〈σ3 = (1, 2), σ6 = (1, 3)〉 ,
to check whether a game G is ordinary symmetric, it is
enough to check (38), for σ3 and σ6 only. A numerical
verification shows the same result, as shown in (39), can
be obtained. ✷
5 Name-irrelevant Symmetry and Its Linear
Representation
This section considers the strategy permutations. We
need some preparations.
Definition 34 Consider Snκ, which can be considered
as a set of permutations on grouped (or double-labeled)
set
O := {(1, 1), (1, 2), ·, (1, κ); · · · ; (n, 1), (n, 2), ·, (n, κ)}
:= {O1,O2, · · · ,On}.
θ ∈ Snκ is called a block permutation if there exists an
object (i, α) such that θ((i, α)) = (j, β), then then θ(i, ·) :
Oi → Oj is a bijection. The set of block permutations is
denoted as Θ[n;κ].
According to above definition, it is easy to verify the
following
Proposition 35 (1) θ ∈ Θ[n;κ], if and only if, there
exist πθ ∈ Sn, which is a permutation on {Oi | i =
1, · · · , n}, and dθ1, · · · , d
θ
n ∈ Sκ, where
dθi = θ|π−1
θ
(i) : Oπ−1
θ
(i) → Oi, (53)
such that
Pθ = D
θPπθ , (54)
where
Dθ = diag(Dθ1, D
θ
2 , · · · , D
θ
n),
and Dθi is the structure matrix of d
θ
i , i = 1, · · · , n.
(2) Θ[n;κ] < Snκ and
∣∣Θ[n;κ]∣∣ = n!(κ!)n.
Next, we give an alternative expression of θ ∈ Θ[n;κ].
Denote
Mθ :=
(
Pπθ ;D
θ
1 , · · · , D
θ
n
)
, (55)
where
Dθi := Pθ|
pi
−1
θ
(i)
, i = 1, · · · , n.
Denote the set of such Mθ byM[n;κ]. That is
M[n;κ] :=
{
Mθ | θ ∈ Θ[n;κ]
}
. (56)
Let
Mα = (Pπα ;D
α
1 , · · · , D
α
n) ∈M[n;κ],
Mβ =
(
Pπβ ;D
β
1 , · · · , D
β
n
)
∈M[n;κ].
Define a product on M[n;κ] as
Mβ◦α :=
(
Pπβ◦α ;D
β◦α
1 , · · · , D
β◦α
n
)
, (57)
where
Pπβ◦α = PπβPπα
D
β◦α
i = D
β
i D
α
π−1
β
(i)
, i = 1, · · · , n.
(58)
Then it is easy to verify that
(
M[n;κ], ◦
)
is a group.
Let θ ∈ Θ[n;κ] and set
P[n;κ] :=
{
Pθ | θ ∈ Θ[n;κ]
}
. (59)
Then it is ready to verify that
P[n;κ] < GL(nκ,R).
Moreover, a straightforward computation shows the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 36 ϕ : P[n;κ] →M[n;κ] as
ϕ(Pθ) :=
(
Pπθ ;Pθ|
pi
−1
θ
(1)
, · · · , Pθ|
pi
−1
θ
(n)
)
, θ ∈ Θ[n;κ].
(60)
is a group isomorphism.
We use an example to depict this.
Example 37 Consider α = (1, 6, 3, 4, 2, 5) ∈ S9, and
β = (1, 2, 3)(4, 9, 6, 8)(5, 7) ∈ S9. Assume they are acting
on
(O1,O2,O3) := (O11,O
1
2 ,O
1
3 ;O
2
1,O
2
2 ,O
2
3;O
3
1 ,O
3
2,O
3
3),
which is a set of blocked elements with n = 3 and κ = 3.
Then we discuss the matrix expression
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• It is easy to verify that both α, β ∈ Θ[3;3]. Moreover,
πα = (1, 2) and πβ = (2, 3).
• Their structure matrices are
Pα =


0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


; Pβ =


0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0


•
α1 = α|π−1α (1) = α|O2 = (1, 2)
Pα1 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1


α2 = α|π−1α (2) = α|O1 = (1, 3)
Pα2 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0


α3 = α|π−1α (3) = α|O3 = id
Pα3 = I3
β1 = β|π−1
β
(1) = β|O1 = (1, 2, 3)
Pβ1 =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


β2 = β|π−1
β
(2) = β|O3 = (1, 2)
Pβ2 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1


β3 = β|π−1
β
(3) = β|O2 = (1, 3, 2)
Pβ3 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0


• Consider γ = β ◦ α. It is easy to calculate that
γ = (1, 8, 4, 3, 9, 6)(2, 7, 5).
πγ = πβ ◦ πα = (1, 3, 2).
• Since Pα, Pβ ∈ P[3;3], we have
Pγ = PβPα =


0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0


∈ P[3;3].
It follows that
γ1 = γ|π−1γ (1) = γ|O2 = (1, 3)
Pγ1 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0


γ2 = γ|π−1γ (2) = γ|O3 = (1, 2)
Pγ2 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1


γ3 = γ|π−1γ (3) = γ|O1 = (1, 2)
Pγ3 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1


(61)
• We already know that Θ[n;κ] is isomorphic to P[n;κ].
To check that M[n;κ] is also isomorphic to them, we
use formula (59) to calculate Dγ1 , D
γ
2 , and D
γ
3 :
D
γ
1 = Pγ1 = Pβ|
pi
−1
β
(1)
Pα|
pi
−1
α (pi
−1
β
(1))
= Pβ|
O1
Pα|
pi
−1
α (1)
= Pβ|
O1
Pα|
O1
=


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0




0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1

 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

 ;
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D
γ
2 = Pγ2 = Pβ|
pi
−1
β
(2)
Pα|
pi
−1
α (pi
−1
β
(2))
= Pβ|
O2
Pα|
pi
−1
α (3)
= Pβ|
O2
Pα|
O3
=


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1




1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1

 ;
D
γ
3 = Pγ3 = Pβ|
pi
−1
β
(3)
Pα|
pi
−1
α (pi
−1
β
(3))
= Pβ|
O3
Pα|
pi
−1
α (2)
= Pβ|
O3
Pα|x2
=


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0




0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

 =


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1

 .
These results coincide with the results in (61).
Definition 38 A normal strategy permutation of G ∈
G[n;κ] is a permutation θ ∈ Snκ, satisfying that for each
i there exists j = π(i), such that θ(Si) = Sj, and hence
θ
∣∣
Si
∈ Sκ, i = 1, · · · , n.
Note that since θ ∈ Snκ, it is forced that π ∈ Sn. To
emphasize that π is induced from θ, it is denoted as πθ.
Now, it is clear that a normal strategy permutation is a
block permutation. That is, θ ∈ Θ[n;κ].
Definition 39 [21] Consider a G ∈ G[n;κ], a normal
strategy permutation θ ∈ Θ[n;κ] is called a strategy sym-
metry of game G if
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = cπθ(i)
(
dθ1(xπ−1
θ
(1)), · · · , d
θ
n(xπ−1
θ
(n))
)
,
i = 1, · · · , n,
(62)
where
dθi := θ|π−1
θ
(i) : Sπ−1
θ
(i) → Si.
The set of strategy symmetries of G is denoted as Θ(G).
Note that θ|π−1
θ
(i) : Sπ−1
θ
(i) → Si, which can be expressed
as follows: Assume δακ ∈ Sπ−1
θ
(i), then θ|π−1
θ
(i) : δ
α
κ 7→ δ
β
κ ,
which is simply considered as a mapping: α 7→ β. From
this point of view, θ|π−1
θ
(i) ∈ Sκ, and its structure matrix
is denoted as
Pθ|
pi
−1
θ
(i)
:= Dθi ∈ Pκ, i = 1, · · · , n.
Using Proposition 13 and the expression (4), a straight-
forward computation shows that (62) can be expressed
as
V ci x = V
c
πθ(i)
⋉
n
j=1 D
θ
jxπ−1
θ
(j)
= V cπθ(i) ⋉
n
j=1 D
θ
jΦπ−1
θ
(j)x
= V cπθ(i)
(
Dθ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗D
θ
n
)
Tπθx
:= V cπθ(i)T
θx.
(63)
Summarizing the above argument yields
Proposition 40 Consider a G ∈ G[n;κ], and a normal
strategy permutation θ ∈ Θ[n;κ]. θ is a strategy symmetry
of game G, if and only if,
V ci = V
c
πθ(i)
T θ, i = 1, · · · , n, (64)
where
T θ =
(
Dθ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗D
θ
n
) (
Φπ−1
θ
(1) ∗ · · · ∗ Φπ−1
θ
(n)
)
. (65)
The following proposition is a modification of the corre-
sponding result from [4].
Proposition 41 Denote the set of strategy symmetries
of G by Θ(G). Then
Θ(G) < Θ[n;κ] < Snκ. (66)
Therefore,Θ(G) is called the strategy symmetric group
of G.
Similar to Corollary 19, Theorem 25 and Theorem 29,
by taking Propositions 31-32 into consideration, we have
the following result:
Theorem 42 Consider a G ∈ G[n;κ]. Assume θ ∈
Θ[n;κ].
(1) ϕn : Θ[n;κ] → G[n;κ] defined by
ϕn(θ) = Pπθ ⊗ T
θ ∈ GL(G[n;κ]) (67)
is a linear representation.
(2) θ ∈ Θ[n;κ] is a normal strategy permutation of G,
i.e., θ ∈ Θ(G), if and only if, VG is invariant with
respect to ϕn(θ).
Example 43 Given G ∈ G[3;3] and θ = β ∈ Θ[3;3],
where β is as in Example 37. The question is: when θ ∈
Θ(G) ?
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First, we calculate Tθ as
T nθ =
(
Dθ1 ⊗D
θ
2 ⊗ · · · ⊗D
θ
n
)
Tπθ
= δ27[15, 12, 18, 13, 10, 16, 14, 11, 17, 24, 21, 27, 22,
19, 25, 23, 20, 26, 6, 3, 9, 4, 1, 7, 5, 2, 8].
According to Proposition 40, θ ∈ Θ(G), if and only if

V c1 = V
c
1 T
θ
V c2 = V
c
3 T
θ
V c3 = V
c
2 T
θ
(68)
(68) is equivalent to

V c1 = V
c
1 T
θ
V c2 = V
c
2 (T
θ)2
V c3 = V
c
2 T
θ
(69)
It follows that the necessary and sufficient condition is:
V c1 = [a, b, b, c, a, a, a, b, b, a, b, b, c, a, a, a,
b, b, a, b, b, c, a, a, a, b, b];
V c2 = [d, e, g, f, g, g, d, g, e, d, e, g, f, g, g, d,
g, e, d, e, g, f, g, g, d, g, e];
V c3 = [g, g, e, f, d, d, g, e, g, g, g, e, f, d, d, g,
e, g, g, g, e, f, d, d, g, e, g],
(70)
where a, b, c, d, e, f, g are arbitrary real numbers.
Definition 44 [4] π ∈ Sn is called a name-irrelevant
player symmetry if there exists a strategy symmetry θ
such that π = πθ. The set of name-irrelevant player sym-
metries is denoted by Π(G). That is,
Π(G) = {πθ | θ ∈ Θ(G)} . (71)
It follows from the definition that Π(G) ⊂ Sn is a sub-
group.
Definition 45 [23] G ∈ G[n;κ] is said to be name-
irrelevant symmetric, if every player permutation is a
name-irrelevant player symmetry, i.e., Π(G) = Sn.
The following example gives the same conclusion as in
[4] with detailed computation.
Example 46 Matching Pennies has payoff bi-matrix as
in Table 3.
It follows from Table 3 that
V c1 = [1,−1,−1, 1]; V
c
2 = [−1, 1, 1,−1].
Table 3
Payoff Bi-matrix of Matching Pennies
P1\P2 1 2
1 1, − 1 −1, 1
2 −1, 1 1, − 1
Denote
Θ[2;2] = {θi | i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
where
Pθ1 =
[
I2 0
0 I2
]
; Pθ2 =
[
I2 0
0 Mn
]
Pθ3 =
[
Mn 0
0 I2
]
; Pθ4 =
[
Mn 0
0 Mn
]
Pθ5 =
[
0 I2
I2 0
]
; Pθ6 =
[
0 I2
Mn 0
]
Pθ7 =
[
0 Mn
I2 0
]
; Pθ8 =
[
0 Mn
Mn 0
]
.
Then,
πθi =
{
id, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
(1, 2), i = 5, 6, 7, 8.
Using (37), we can calculate that
T θi =


(
Dθi1 ⊗D
θi
2
) (
(I2 ⊗ 1T2 ) ∗ (1
T
2 ⊗ I2)
)
i = 1, 2, 3, 4,(
Dθi1 ⊗D
θi
2
) (
(1T2 ⊗ I2) ∗ (I2 ⊗ 1
T
2 )
)
i = 5, 6, 7, 8.
According to Proposition 40, θi ∈ Θ(G), if and only if
{
V c1 = V
c
1 T
θi,
V c2 = V
c
2 T
θi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
or {
V c1 = V
c
2 T
θi,
V c2 = V
c
1 T
θi, i = 5, 6, 7, 8.
A straightforward verification shows that
Θ(G) = {θ1, θ4, θ6, θ7} .
It is obvious that Π(G) = S2. Hence, G is of name-
irrelevant player symmetry.
6 Potential Game
Definition 47 Let G = (N,S,C) ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. G is
called a weighted potential game, if there exist a set of
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weights wi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n, and a function P : S → R,
called the potential function, such that
ci(xi, s−i)− ci(yi, s−i) = wi[P (xi, s−i)− P (yi, s−i)],
xi, yi ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i, i = 1, · · · , n.
(72)
Whenwi = 1, i = 1, · · · , n,G is called a (exact) potential
game.
Denote
k[i,j] =
{
1, i > j∏j
s=i ks, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
(73)
Using (73), we define
Ei := Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n] , i = 1, · · · , n. (74)
Then we construct Ew(n), ξw(n), and bw(n) as follows:
Ew(n) :=


−w2E1 w1E2 0 · · · 0
−w3E1 0 w1E3 · · · 0
...
−wnE1 0 0 · · · w1En

 (75)
ξw(n) =


ξw1
ξw2
...
ξwn

 , (76)
where ξwi ∈ R
k/ki (k =
∏n
s=1 ki) are unknowns.
bw(n) =


bw2
bw3
...
bwn

 =


(w1V
c
2 − w2V
c
1 )
T
(w1V
c
3 − w3V
c
1 )
T
...
(w1V
c
n − wnV
c
1 )
T

 , (77)
where V ci is the structure vector of ci, that is
ci(x1, · · · , xn) = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 xj , xj ∈ Sj , i = 1, · · · , n.
Finally, we build a linear system, called the potential
equation, as
Ew(n)ξw(n) = bw(n). (78)
Similar to the corresponding result in [9], we can prove
the following result:
Theorem 48 A game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a weighted
potential game with wi > 0, i = 1, · · · , n, if and only if,
the equation (78) has solution. Moreover, if a solution
exists, then a structure vector of the potential function P
is
V P =
1
w1
(
V c1 − (ξ
w
1 )
T
ET1
)
. (79)
Remark 49 When wi = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, the results be-
come the corresponding results for pure potential games.
In this case, the superscripts w in above formulas are all
removed.
7 Symmetric Boolean Games
7.1 Matrix Expression of Symmetric Boolean Games
Assume G ∈ G[n;2], then G is called a Boolean game,
because the strategy sets Si = {0, 1}, i = 1, · · · , n. To
investigate the ordinary symmetry of Boolean games,
we first give an alternative definition. To this end, we
introduce a new concept first.
Definition 50 [4] Consider a finite game G =
(N,S,C) ∈ G[n;κ], and let s ∈ S, the strategy multiplicity
vector of s is defined as
#(s) = (#(s, 1),#(s, 2), · · · ,#(s, κ)) , (80)
where
#(s, i) := |{sj | sj = i}| , i = 1, · · · , κ.
Note that if t ∈ SN1 :=
∏
j∈N1
Sj, then #(t) is defined in
a similar way. Particularly, #(s−i) ∈ Rn is well defined.
It is easy to verify the following equivalent condition of
ordinary symmetry.
Proposition 51 Let G ∈ G[n;κ] be a finite game. G
is weighted ordinary symmetric with respect to µi, i =
1, · · · , n, if and only if,
µici(xi, x−i) = µjcj(yj , y−j), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, (81)
where xi = yj, and #(x−i) = #(y−j).
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Remark 52 When µi = 1, i = 1, · · · , n, (81) becomes a
necessary and sufficient condition for ordinary symme-
try. It is used as the definition of ordinary symmetry in
[4].
According to (40) with wi = 1, ∀i, we know that a game
G ∈ G[n;κ] is ordinary symmetric, if and only if, for any
σ ∈ Sn we have
V ci ⋉
n
i=1 xi = V
c
σ(i) ⋉
n
i=1 xσ−1(i). (82)
Express ci into algebraic form as
ci(x) = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 xj = V
c
i W[κ,κi−1]xi ⋉j 6=i xj . (83)
According to Proposition 32 (precisely, equation (52),
it is enough to check (83) for σ = (1, s) ∈ Sn−1 (2 ≤
s ≤ n − 1) on {xj | j 6= i} will not change ci(x). We,
therefore, have
ci(x) = V
c
i W[κ,κi−1]xiW[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1] ⋉j 6=i xj
= V ci W[κ,κi−1]
(
Iκ ⊗W[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1]
)
xi ⋉j 6=i xj
= V ci W[κ,κi−1]
(
Iκ ⊗W[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1]
)
W[κi−1,κ] ⋉
n
j=1 xj
(84)
Comparing (83) with (84) yields that
V ci
[
W[κ,κi−1]
(
Iκ ⊗W[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1]
)
W[κi−1,κ] − Ir
]
= 0, s = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1,
(85)
where r = max{κi, κs+1}.
According to Proposition 32, as long as V ci satisfies (82),
for any σ ∈ Sn and σ(i) = i, we have
ci(x) = ci
(
xσ−1(1), xσ−1(2), · · · , xσ−1(n)
)
. (86)
Hence, (86) is the necessary and sufficient condition for
a single payoff function to be satisfied in a symmetric
game.
Next, we consider the condition for cross payoffs, that is,
for any two payoff functions in a symmetric game need
to be satisfied. Note that for p 6= q,{
cp(x) = V
c
pW[κ,κp−1]xp ⋉j 6=p xj
cq(x) = V
c
q W[κ,κq−1]xq ⋉j 6=q xj .
(87)
Assume xp = xq, then #(x−p) = #(x−q). According to
Proposition 51, we have
V cpW[κ,κp−1] = V
c
q W[κ,κq−1], p 6= q. (88)
Taking i = 1 for (86) and p = 1 for(88), it is ready to
verify the following result:
Theorem 53 G ∈ G[n;κ] is a symmetric game, if and
only if,
(i)
V c1
[
Iκ ⊗
(
W[κs−2,κ]W[κ,κs−1]
)
− Iks+1
]
= 0,
s = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1.
(89)
(ii)
V ci = V
c
1 W[κi−1,κ], i = 2, 3, · · · , n. (90)
7.2 Verification of Symmetric Boolean Games
This subsection considers when a Boolean game is sym-
metric. Let G ∈ G[n;2], and according to (89),
V c1 ∈ I2 ⊗
[
W[2s−2,2]W[2,2s−1] − I2s
]⊥
⊗ I2n−s−1 ,
s = 2, 3, · · · , n− 1.
(91)
Using formula (15), we can calculate that
[
W[2s−2,2]W[2,2s−1] − I2s
]⊥
=
[(
W[2s−2,2] ⊗ I2
) (
I2s−2 ⊗W[2,2]
) (
W[2,2s−2] ⊗ I2
)
−I2s ]
⊥
=
{(
W[2s−2,2] ⊗ I2
) [
I2s−2 ⊗
(
W[2,2] − I4
)]
(
W[2,2s−2] ⊗ I2
)}⊥
=
(
W[2s−2,2] ⊗ I2
) [
I2s−2 ⊗
(
W[2,2] + I4
)]
(
W[2,2s−2] ⊗ I2
)
=
[
W[2s−2,2]W[2,2s−1] + I2s
]
.
The penultimate equality comes from (i) the orthogo-
nality and (ii) the dimension complementary.
Next, we investigate the vector space structure of V c1 ,
satisfying (89). Note that for each s−1 ∈ S−1 the
#(s−1, 0) (or #(s−1, 1)) could be {0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1}.
According to Proposition 51,
S
j
−1 := {s−1 ∈ S−1 | #(s−1, 0) = j} , j = 0, 1, · · · , n−1
has the same value of c1(x1, x−1). Hence, for symmetric
Boolean games V c1 is of dimension 2n, where the 2 comes
from the fact that x1 has two possible choices. But since
V c1 ∈ R
2n we construct a mapping hn : R
2n → R2
n
, such
that a symmetric game satisfies V c1 ∈ Im(hn), where
Im(hn) is the image set of hn.
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To construct this hn, we first set T2 := I2. Then we
inductively construct
Tk+1 :=
[
Tk 02k−1
02k−1 Tk
]
, k = 2, 3, · · · . (92)
Then we define
Hk := I2 ⊗ Tk, k = 2, 3, · · · . (93)
A straightforward computation shows the following:
Proposition 54 Let hn : R
2n → R2
n
be the mapping
determined by
hn(x) := Hnx, x ∈ R
2n.
Then V c1 is a suitable candidate of V
c
1 for a symmetric
Boolean game, if and only if, V c1 = h
T
n (x), for some
x ∈ R2n. In other words, for all x ∈ R2n that hTn (x)
satisfy (89), and vise versa.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Example 55 (1) Constructing Hn:
Since T2 = I2, we have
H2 = I2 ⊗ I2 = I4.
T3 =
[
T2 02
02 T2
]
=


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 ,
T4 =
[
T3 04
04 T3
]
=


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1


,
and so on. Then H3 = I2 ⊗ T3, H4 = I2 ⊗ T4, and
so on.
(2) Constructing Symmetric Boolean Game:
Consider G ∈ G[4;2], and denote
x = (A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H)T ∈ R8.
Using Proposition 54 and equation (90), we have
that G is an ordinary symmetric game, if and only
if,
V c1 = (H4x)
T
= [A,B,B,C,B,C,C,D,E, F, F,G, F,G,G,H ];
V c2 = V
c
1 W[2,2]
= [A,B,B,C,E, F, F,G,B,C,C,D, F,G,G,H ];
V c3 = V
c
1 W[4,2]
= [A,B,E, F,B,C, F,G,B,C, F,G,C,D,G,H ];
V c4 = V
c
1 W[8,2]
= [A,E,B, F,B, F, C,G,B, F, C,G,C,G,D,H ].
(94)
We conclude that G ∈ G[4;2] is an ordinary symmet-
ric game, if and only if,
VG = AV1 +BV2 + CV3 +DV4
+EV5 + FV6 +GV6 +HV8,
(95)
where {Vi | i = 1, 2, · · · , 8} form a basis of the
ordinary symmetric subspace of G[4;2], and they are:
V1 =


δ116
δ116
δ116
δ116


T
,
V2 =


δ216 + δ
3
16 + δ
5
16
δ216 + δ
3
16 + δ
9
16
δ216 + δ
5
16 + δ
9
16
δ316 + δ
5
16 + δ
9
16


T
,
V3 =


δ416 + δ
6
16 + δ
7
16
δ416 + δ
10
16 + δ
11
16
δ616 + δ
10
16 + δ
13
16
δ716 + δ
11
16 + δ
13
16


T
,
V4 =


δ816
δ1216
δ1416
δ1516


T
,
V5 =


δ916
δ516
δ316
δ916


T
,
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V6 =


δ1016 + δ
6
11 + δ
13
16
δ616 + δ
7
16 + δ
13
16
δ416 + δ
7
16 + δ
11
16
δ416 + δ
6
16 + δ
10
16


T
,
V7 =


δ1216 + δ
14
16 + δ
15
16
δ816 + δ
14
16 + δ
15
16
δ816 + δ
12
16 + δ
15
16
δ816 + δ
12
16 + δ
14
16


T
,
V8 =


δ1616
δ1616
δ1616
δ1616


T
.
Denote by So[n;κ] ⊂ G[n;κ] the subspace of ordinary sym-
metric games. Then Theorem 53 and Proposition 54 im-
ply the following result.
Proposition 56 (1) G ∈ So[n;2], if and only if, the
equation


I2n
W[2,2] ⊗ I2n−2
W[2,4] ⊗ I2n−3
...
W[2,2n−1]


Hnv = V
T
G (96)
has solution v ∈ R2n.
(2)
dim
(
So[n;2]
)
= 2n. (97)
7.3 Symmetric Game vs Potential Game
Applying (96) to Theorem 48 yields the following result:
Lemma 57 A symmetric game G ∈ So[n;2] is a potential
game, if and only if, for any v ∈ R2n
E(n)ξ(n) = Bnv (98)
has solution ξ, where
B(n) =


−I2n +W[2,2] ⊗ I2n−2
−I2n +W[2,4] ⊗ I2n−3
−I2n +W[2,8] ⊗ I2n−4
...
−I2n +W[2,2n−1]


. (99)
Note that since (98) has solution for arbitrary v, equa-
tion (98) is equivalent to
E(n)Kn = B(n)Hn (100)
has solution Kn ∈ Mn2n−1×2n. In fact, Coli(Kn) is the
solution ξ(n) for v = δi2n, i = 1, 2, · · · , 2n.
Lemma 58 The solution Kn of the equation (100) ex-
ists.
Proof. See the Appendix B. ✷
Splitting
Kn =


K1n
K2n
...
Knn

 ,
where Kin ∈ M2n−1×2n, i = 1, · · · , n. Then we have the
following conclusion:
Theorem 59 Given a Boolean game G ∈ G[n;2] with
VG satisfying (96), i.e., G ∈ So[n;2] . Then it is a poten-
tial game. Moreover, the structure vector of its potential
function is
V P = vT
(
HTn − (K
1
n)
TET1
)
, (101)
where v ∈ R2n is the solution of (96).
Example 60 Consider a G ∈ So[4;2] as described in a
general form (95). It is easy to calculate that
T4 =


0 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 0 1 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 −1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


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By definition
E1 = 12 ⊗ I23 .
And the H4 is obtained in Example 55. Using formula
(101), we can calculate the structure vector of G as
V P = vT
(
HT4 − (K
1
4 )
TET1
)
:= vTΨ, (102)
where
v = [A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H ]T ∈ R8,
and
Ψ =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
−1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 −1 −1 0 −1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 −1 −1 −1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


.
Note that (102) provides a general formula for the poten-
tial function of G ∈ So[4;2].
7.4 Weighted (Boolean) Games
Proposition 61 Consider a Boolean game G ∈ G[n;κ].
AssumeG is weighted symmetric satisfying (40). ThenG
is a weighted potential game with wi =
1
µi
, i = 1, · · · , n.
Proof. Construct an auxiliary game Gµ by setting its
payoff functions as
c
µ
i (x) := µici(x), i = 1, · · · , n.
Then (40) implies that Gµ is an ordinary symmetric
game. According to Theorem 59,Gµ is a potential game.
Hence there exists a potential function P such that
µici(xi, s−i)− µici(yi, s−i) = P (xi, s−i)− P (yi, s−i),
i = 1, · · · , n.
(103)
(103) implies that G is a weighted potential game with
wi =
1
µi
, i = 1, · · · , n. ✷
Using wi =
1
µi
, (75) and (77) can be converted to
Eµ(n) :=


−µ1E1 µ2E2 0 · · · 0
−µ1E1 0 µ3E3 · · · 0
...
−µ1E1 0 0 · · · µnEn

 (104)
and
bµ(n) =


b2µ
b3µ
...
bnµ

 =


(µ2V
c
2 − µ1V
c
1 )
T
(µ3V
c
3 − µ1V
c
1 )
T
...
(µnV
c
n − µ1V
c
1 )
T

 . (105)
It follows that (78) becomes
Eµ(n)ξµ(n) = bµ(n). (106)
Hence, we have
Corollary 62 The potential function of weighted sym-
metric Boolean game G ∈ Sw[n;2] is determined by its
structure vector as
V P = µ1
(
V c1 −
(
ξ1µ
)T
ET1
)
, (107)
where ξ1µ ∈ R
2n−1 is the first block of the solution of (106).
Finally, to verify whether G ∈ G[n;κ] is weighted sym-
metric, the above argument leads Theorem 53 to the fol-
lowing modification.
Proposition 63 A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is weighted sym-
metric with respect to {µi, i = 1, · · · , n}, if and only if,
(89) and the following (108) hold with some ei =
µ1
µi
> 0,
i = 2, · · · , n.
V ci = eiV
c
1 W[κi−1,κ], i = 2, 3, · · · , n. (108)
Next, we consider a renaming symmetric game G ∈
Sr[n;κ]. If κ = 2, then it is obvious that G is a potential
game. Then we try to calculate its potential function.
We ask a general question: When a renaming game is a
potential game?
Finally, from equation (103) one sees that the potential
function of a weighted symmetric game G ∈ Sw[n;κ] is
the same as its modified game Gµ, which is a symmetric
game. Hence if G ∈ Sw[n;2], the formula (101) can be used
to calculate its potential function. We give an example
to depict it.
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Example 64 Recall Example 23. Since µ1 = 3 and µ2 =
2, its modified form Gµ has payoff bi-matrix as in Table
4.
Table 4
Payoff Bi-matrix of Gµ
P1\P2 1 2
1 6, 6 12, 18
2 18, 12 12, 12
Then
VGµ = [6, 12, 18, 12, 6, 18, 12, 12].
Using formula (102),
VGµ = v
T [HT2 , H
T
2 W
T
[2,2]]
= vT


1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

 .
It follows that
v = [6, 12, 18, 12]T .
Note that H2 = I4, E1 = 12 ⊗ I2,
K12 =
[
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
]
.
Substituting them into (101) yields
V P = vTΨ
where
Ψ = HT2 −K
1
2E
T
1 =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

 .
Finally, we have
V P = [−12, 0, 0, 0],
and then the potential function is
P (x1, x2) = [−12, 0, 0, 0]x1x2.
7.5 Renaming (Boolean) Games
Consider a renaming symmetric game G ∈ Sr[n;κ]. As-
sume the renamed game Gr has structure vectors V ri ,
i = 1, · · · , n. From the proof of Proposition 28, we know
V ri = V
c
i Γ
T
r , i = 1, · · · , n. (109)
where
Γr := Pr1 ⊗ Pr2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Prn .
Definition 65 A gameG ∈ G[n;κ] is renaming potential,
if there exist a renaming r = (r1, · · · , rn), ri ∈ Sκ, i =
1, · · · , n such that the renamed game Gr is potential.
Note that ri ∈ Sκ changes only the order of the strategies
within each Si, so if the renaming game G
r satisfies
cri (xi, s−i)− c
r
i (yi, s−i) = P
r(xi, s−i)− P r(yi, s−i),
xi, yi ∈ Si, s−i ∈ S−i, i = 1, · · · , n,
(110)
then G also satisfies (110).
Applying Theorem 48 to Gr yields the following:
Proposition 66 (1) A game G ∈ G[n;κ] is renaming
potential with renaming r = (ri | i = 1, · · · , n), if
and only if,
E(n)ξ(n) = (In−1 ⊗ Γr)b(n) (111)
has solution, where E(n), b(n) and ξ(n) are as in
(76) and (77) respectively withwi = 1, i = 1, · · · , n.
(2) If (111) has solution, then the structure vector of a
potential function is
V P
r
= V c1 Γ
T
r − ξ
T
1 E
T
1 , (112)
where ξ1 is the first block of the solution of (111).
Finally, we consider G ∈ Se[n;2]. From the above argu-
ment we know that Gr is ordinary symmetric and hence
is potential. It follows that G is also potential with the
same potential function. In addition to this, the formula
(101) can be used to calculate its potential function as
follows: First, we construct the potential function for re-
named system Gr using (101) as
V P
r
= vT
(
HTn − (K
1
n)
TET1
)
.
Then we have the potential function with respect to Gr
as
P r(x) = V P
r
⋉
n
i=1 xi.
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Note that
r−1i (xi) = Pr−1
i
xi = P
T
rixi, i = 1, · · · , n,
and using Proposition 4, we have
P r(x) = P (r−11 (x1), · · · , r
−1
n (xn))
= V PPTr1 ⊗ P
T
r2 · · · ⊗ P
T
rnx
= V PΓTr x
(113)
and
V P = V P
r
Γr. (114)
We give an example to demonstrate it.
Example 67 Recall Example 27. As we mentioned
there, using r1 = id and r2 = (1, 2), we have a renamed
system, which has its payoffs as in Table 5
Table 5
Payoff Bi-matrix of Renamed Battle of the Sexes
P1\P2 F C
F 0, 0 2, 1
C 1, 2 0, 0
Then we have
VGr = [0, 2, 1, 0, 0, 1, 2, 0].
VGr = v
T [HT2 , H
T
2 W
T
[2,2]]
= vT


1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

 .
It follows that
v = [0, 2, 1, 0]T .
Note that H2 = I4, E1 = 12 ⊗ I2,
K12 =
[
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
]
.
Substituting them into (101) yields
V P
r
= vTΨ
where
Ψ = HT2 − (K
1
2 )
TET1 =


1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1

 .
Hence
V P
r
= vTΨ = [−1, 0, 0,−2].
Using formula (114) yields
V P = V P
r
(I2 ⊗Mn) = [0,−1,−2, 0].
Hence the potential function of the Battle of the Sexes is
P (x) = [0,−1,−2, 0]x1x2.
8 Negation-symmetric Boolean Games
In previous sections it was seen that a (ordinary or re-
naming or weighted) symmetric Boolean game is a po-
tential game (could be weighted one). Carefully verifying
Example 46 can show that in general a name-irrelevant
symmetric game G ∈ G[n;2] is not necessarily to be a
(weighted) potential game. This section shows that a
special class of G ∈ G[n;2], which is not a class of (ordi-
nary or renaming or weighted) symmetric Boolean game,
is also potential.
Definition 68 A game G ∈ G[n;2] is called a negation-
symmetric Boolean game, if
ci(¬x1, x2, · · · ,¬xi, · · · , xn) = c1(x1, · · · , xn),
i = 2, · · · , n.
(115)
The following proposition can be used to verify if G is
negation-symmetric.
Proposition 69 A game G ∈ G[n;2] is negation-
symmetric, if and only if,
V ci = V
c
1 (I2i−1 ⊗Mn)Mn, i = 2, 3, · · · , n. (116)
Proof. Express (115) into algebraic form, and then use
Proposition 4, (116) can easily be obtained. ✷
Example 70 Given a game G ∈ G[2;2]. G is a negation-
symmetric game, if and only if, its payoff bi-matrix is as
in Table 6.
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Table 6
Payoff Bi-matrix
P1\P2 1 2
1 a, b c, d
2 d, c b, a
Theorem 71 A negation-symmetric Boolean game is a
potential game.
Proof. Using (116), we have
(V ci )
T − (V c1 )
T
= [Mn (I2i−1 ⊗Mn)− I2i ] (V
c
1 )
T
,
i = 2, · · · , n.
(117)
From (117), an algebraic computation shows that


(V c2 − V
c
1 )
T
(V c3 − V
c
1 )
T
...
(V cn − V
c
1 )
T

 =


Mn ⊗Mn ⊗ I2n−2 − I2n
Mn ⊗ I2 ⊗Mn ⊗ I2n−3 − I2n
...
Mn ⊗ I2n−2 ⊗Mn − I2n

 (V
c
1 )
T
:= Γ (V c1 )
T
.
(118)
Substituting it into the potential equation (78) with
wi = 1 leads to
E(n)B = Γ, (119)
where
B =


1T2 ⊗ I2n−1
Mn ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I2n−2
Mn ⊗ I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I2n−3
...
Mn ⊗ I2n−2 ⊗ 1
T
2


. (120)
(We refer the readers to Appendix C for details.)
It follows that
B (V c1 )
T
(121)
is a solution of the potential equation (78) (with wi = 1
∀i) . The conclusion follows. ✷
It is easy to figure out that
ξ1 =
[
1T2 ⊗ I2n−1
]
(V c1 )
T
.
It follows from (79) that the potential function has the
structure vector as
V P = V c1
[
I2n − 12 ⊗ I2n−1E
T
1
]
= −V c1 [Mn ⊗ I2n−1 ] .
(122)
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the symmetry of finite games G ∈
G[n;κ]. Roughly speaking, it was shown that G is sym-
metric with respect to a θ ∈ Θ[n;κ] ⊂ Snκ means the
structure vector VG is invariant with respect to a linear
representation of θ.
More precisely, the linear representation of θ can be char-
acterized as
(
Pπθ ;D
θ
1, D
θ
2 , · · · , D
θ
n
)
.
Particularly, this representation can be classified as fol-
lows:
• When Dθi = Iκ, ∀i, G is ordinary symmetric.
• When Dθi = wiIκ, G is weighted symmetric.
• When Dθi = Di, (i.e., it is independent of θ) G is
renaming symmetric.
• For generalDθi , G is strategy-permutation symmetric
with respect to θ. And as Π(G) = Sn, G is name-
irrelevant symmetric.
The linear representation of Snκ (or its subgroups) in
the structure vector space VG of G is a convenient tool
to investigate the properties of symmetric games.
Then the relationship between symmetric games and po-
tential games is investigated. It was shown that G ∈
So[n;2] and G ∈ S
r
[n;2] are also potential games. G ∈
Sw[n;2] is also a weighted potential game. The formulas
for calculating their corresponding potential functions
are also presented. In addition to this three kind of
Boolean games, a class ofG ∈ G[n;2], called the negation-
symmetric Boolean games, is also proved to be potential.
Several problems remain for further investigation:
(1) General dimension and basis of So[n;κ] are still un-
known.
(2) When a networked game is symmetric?
(3) Orthogonal decomposition of G[n;κ] into S
o
[n;κ] and
(So[n;κ])
⊥ is still unknown.
(4) More properties of symmetric games may be de-
duced from their linear representations.
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Appendix
A. The proof of Proposition 54:
We give a lemma first.
Lemma 72 Let hi = Coli(Hn), i = 1, · · · , 2n. Then we
have
hTi x =


1, x1 = δ
1
2 , ♯(x−1, 1) = n− i, i ≤ n,
1, x1 = δ
2
2 , ♯(x−1, 1) = 2n− i, i > n,
0, Otherwise.
(123)
Proof. Form the definition of Hn in (93), Hn = I2 ⊗ Tn
where Tn ∈ B2n−1×n. Denote the i-th column of Tn as
ti, then we have
hTi =
{[
tTi ,0
T
2n−1
]
, i = 1, · · · , n,[
0T2n−1 , t
T
i−n
]
, i = n+ 1, · · · , 2n.
(124)
Substituting (124) into (123), we claim that (123) holds,
if and only if,
tTi x2 · · ·xn =
{
1, ♯(x−1, 1) = n− i,
0, Otherwise.
i = 1, · · · , n.
(125)
The claim can be proved using mathematical induction:
It is easy to verify (125) for n = 2. Then we set ti =
Coli(Tk) and assume (125) holds for n = k. That is,
tTi x2 · · ·xk =
{
1, ♯(x−1, 1) = k − i,
0, Otherwise.
i = 1, · · · , k.
(126)
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From the definition of Tk+1 as in (92), we have
Tk+1 =
[
t1 t2 · · · tk tk+1
t0 t1 · · · tk−1 tk
]
, (127)
where t0 = tk+1 = 02k−1 .
Then the s-th column of Tk+1 is [t
T
s , t
T
s−1]
T . Using as-
sumption (126), we get
[tTs , t
T
s−1]x2x3 · · ·xk+1
= [tTs x3 · · ·xk+1, t
T
s−1x3 · · ·xk+1]x2
=


1 x2 = δ
1
2 , ♯(x−{1,2}, 1) = k − s,
1 x2 = δ
2
2 , ♯(x−{1,2}, 1) = k − s+ 1,
0 Otherwise.
=
{
1 ♯(x−1, 1) = k + 1− s,
0 Otherwise.
(128)
This implies that (125) is true for n = k + 1. Therefore,
(125) holds for every n and (123) follows. ✷
Now it is ready to prove Proposition 54.
Proof. Proposition 54 is equivalent to that the column set
of Hn contains a basis of V
c
1 for any symmetric boolean
game G ∈ So[n;2].
From the argument before Proposition 54, we know that
the dimension of V c1 for G ∈ S
o
[n;2] is 2n. It is easy to
check that |Col(Hn)| = 2n. Denote
hi = Coli(Hn), i = 1, · · · , 2n.
Then, it is sufficient show that {hi, i = 1, · · · , 2n} is a
basis of V c1 for S
o
[n;2].
First, we prove that hi, i = 1, · · · , 2n, are linearly inde-
pendent. To this end, let
2n∑
i=1
aihi = 02n . (129)
Taking transpose on both sides and multiplying both
sides by xi ∈ ∆2n with ♯(xi, 1) = n − i for i = 1, · · ·n
and xi with ♯(xi, 1) = 2n−i for i = n+1, · · · , n, then we
have ai = 0, i = 1, · · · , 2n. As a result, hi, i = 1, · · · , 2n
are linearly independent.
Second, we prove that each hi is a suitable candidate
of V c1 for G ∈ S
o
[n;2]. According to Proposition 51, this
means that
hTi x1 · · ·xn = h
T
i y1 · · · yn, (130)
where x1 = y1, and ♯(x−1) = ♯(y−1). Using Lemma 72,
it is straightforward to verify this.
Therefore, {hi, i = 1, · · · , 2n} is a basis of V c1 for G ∈
So[n;2], and Proposition 54 follows. ✷
B. The proof of Lemma 58:
We prove it by construction. Set
Kn := 1n ⊗Qn, (131)
where
Qn := [02n−1 ,−Rn, Rn,02n−1], (132)
and Rn ∈M2n−1×(n−1) is defined recursively as


R2 = δ
1
2 ,
Rt+1 =
[
Rt 12t−1
02t−1 Rt
]
, t ≥ 2.
(133)
We prove that the Kn defined by (131)-(133) satisfies
equation (100). That is, we need to show that
(−E1 + Ei)Qn =
(
−I2n +W[2,2i−1] ⊗ I2n−i
)
Hn.
i = 2, · · · , n.
(134)
To this end, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 73 Let ri = Coli(Rn), i = 1, · · · , n − 1, then
we have
rTi x1 · · ·xn−1 =
{
1, ♯(x, 1) ≥ n− i,
0, Otherwise.
(135)
Proof. We prove it by mathematical induction. It is easy
to verify (135) for n = 2. Then we assume that (135)
holds for n = k. Denoting ri as the i-th column of Rk,
we have
rTi x1 · · ·xk−1 =
{
1, ♯(x, 1) ≥ k − i,
0, Otherwise.
(136)
Next, we express Rk+1 row by row as
Rk+1 =
[
r1, r2 · · · rk−1 rk
r0 r1, · · · rk−2 rk−1
]
(137)
where r0 = 02k−1 and rk = 12k−1 .
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Then the s-th column of Rk+1 is [r
T
s , r
T
s−1]
T . Using as-
sumption (136), we have
[rTs , r
T
s−1]x1x2 · · ·xk
= [rTs x2 · · ·xk, r
T
s−1x2 · · ·xk]x1
=


1 x1 = δ
1
2 , ♯(x−1, 1) ≥ k − s,
1 x1 = δ
2
2 , ♯(x−1, 1) ≥ k − s+ 1,
0 Otherwise
=
{
1 ♯(x, 1) ≥ k + 1− s,
0 Otherwise
(138)
Therefore, (135) holds for n = k + 1 and the Lemma is
proved.✷ Now it is ready to give the proof of Lemma 58.
Proof. Denote the s-th column of Qn and Hn by qs and
hs respectively. Substituting them into each row-block
equations of (134) and taking transpose on both sides,
we have the following equalities for i = 2, · · · , n:
qTs (−E
T
1 + E
T
i ) = h
T
s (−I2n +W[2i−1,2]),
s = 1, 2, · · · , 2n.
(139)
Based on the fact that (139) holds, if and only if, for any
x = ⋉ni=1xi ∈ ∆2n ,
qTs (−E
T
1 + E
T
i )x = h
T
s (−I2n +W[2i−1,2])x,
x = ⋉ni=1xi ∈ ∆2n , s = 1, 2, · · · , 2n.
(140)
And equivalently,
qTs (−x−1 + x−i) = h
T
s (−x1x−1 + xix−i),
x = ⋉ni=1xi ∈ ∆2n , s = 1, 2, · · · , 2n.
(141)
Note that
qs =
{
−rs−1, s ≤ n,
rs−n, s > n,
(142)
where
rs =
{
Cols(Rn), s = 1, · · · , n− 1,
02n−1 , s = 0, n.
(143)
If x1 = xi, then ♯(x−i) = ♯(x−1). According to Lemma
72 and Lemma 73, it is easy to check that both sides of
(140) are equal to zero.
If x1 6= xi, without loss of generosity we assume that
x1 = δ
1
2 , and xi = δ
2
2 , then
♯(x−1, 1) = ♯(x−i, 1)− 1. (144)
From (123), we know that the right-hand side (RHS) of
(140) equals to zero except
{
RHS = −1, ♯(x−1) = n− s, s ≤ n,
RHS = 1, ♯(x−i) = 2n− s, s > n,
(145)
From (135), we know that the left-hand side (LHS) of
(140) equals to zero except LHS = 1 if
{
♯(x−1) ≥ n− s+ 1 ♯(x−i, 1) < n− s+ 1, s ≤ n,
♯(x−i) ≥ 2n− s, ♯(x−1, 1) < 2n− s, s > n,
(146)
and LHS = −1 if{
♯(x−1) < n− s+ 1, ♯(x−i, 1) ≥ n− s+ 1, s ≤ n,
♯(x−i) < 2n− s, ♯(x−1, 1) ≥ 2n− s, s > n.
(147)
Taking the constraint (144) into consideration, then


LHS = −1, ♯(x−1, 1) = n− s, s ≤ n,
LHS = 1, ♯(x−i, 1) = 2n− s, s > n,
LHS = 0, Otherwise.
(148)
Hence LHS = RHS.
Then (139) follows and this completes the proof of
Lemma 58. ✷
C. The proof (119):
For any i = 2, · · · , n, we have
−E1B1 + EiBi
= −E11T2 ⊗ I2n−1 + EiMn ⊗ I2i−2 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I2n−i
= −
[
1, 1
1, 1
]
⊗ I2n−1 +Mn ⊗ I2i−2 ⊗
[
1, 1
1, 1
]
⊗ I2n−i
= −(Mn + I2)⊗ I2n−1 +Mn ⊗ I2i−2 ⊗ (Mn + I2)⊗ I2n−i
= Mn ⊗ I2i−2 ⊗Mn ⊗ I2n−i − I2n
= Γi,
(149)
where Bi ∈ B2n−1×2n and Γi ∈ B2n×2n are the i-th row
block of B and Γ respectively. Therefore, (119) follows.
✷
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